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DRIVING OFF THE FACE OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT:  WEIGHING CABALLES UNDER 
THE PROPOSED “VEHICULAR FRISK” 
STANDARD 
Christopher M. Pardo* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although society charges law enforcement with eliminating illegal 
drug activity, the individual Fourth Amendment rights1 of every 
American citizen must also be respected.  In Illinois v. Caballes,2 the 
Supreme Court held that a trained drug-detection dog’s sniff does not 
constitute a search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and that the 
dog’s alert, in itself, constitutes the requisite probable cause to search a 
citizen’s vehicle.  Although Caballes may be effective in helping police 
battle a burgeoning drug trade, as it allows police to walk a drug-
detection dog around any lawfully stopped vehicle, it also creates a 
situation ripe for the exploitation of underprivileged citizens—such as a 
situation where police conduct a traffic stop on false pretenses and the 
drug-detection dog then mistakenly alerts to the vehicle.  American 
society is divided along economic and racial lines.  These divisions in 
American society can be exacerbated, either inadvertently or purposely, 
through legally approved methods that further the violation of 
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches.  Id.  Specifically, it 
provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[] . . . .”  Id.  But 
searches are permissible upon a showing of “probable cause[]”  Id.  Difficult to define in a 
technical sense, probable cause is the showing that the government must satisfy in order to 
be allowed to conduct a full Fourth Amendment search.  State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 
1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1991)).  
Probable cause has been explained as follows: 
As a legal concept, “probable cause” is not capable of a bright-line test.  
Rather, it involves a fact-intensive analysis that necessarily varies from 
context to context.  In particular, the courts are required to weigh two 
interests that usually are in conflict:  society’s recognition that its police 
forces should be given discretion to investigate any reasonable 
probability that a crime has occurred, and the individual’s interest in 
not being subjected to groundless intrusions upon privacy. 
Id. 
2 See 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005). 
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constitutional rights and encourage mistreatment of the more vulnerable 
segments of society, namely poor and minority citizens. 
The Caballes decision could have been decided many different ways, 
and some ways may have been more logical when viewed in the context 
of the Fourth Amendment’s balancing of personal and government 
interests.  In the absence of even the merest reasonable suspicion, a drug-
detection dog’s alert should not be considered sufficient to merit 
probable cause. 
The Caballes Court could have ruled that a dog-sniff was the 
automotive equivalent to a frisk; therefore, before allowing a drug-
detection dog to sniff a car, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio,3 the officer would 
need an articulable and reasonable suspicion that crime was “afoot” and 
would not, for example, be allowed to frisk a citizen stopped for 
speeding, absent any other facts.  Applying this Terry standard to drug-
detection, dog use would lead to more fair and just results for several 
reasons. 
First, alerts by drug-detection dogs, as delineated in the Caballes 
dissent, are not reliable enough to qualify alone as probable cause.4  
Although the conclusion reached from the research is not absolute, and 
each dog is different, even a single mistake justified through application 
of the Caballes standard should be considered one too many.  Raising the 
standard even slightly takes away the accountability for the mistakes 
from a dog and places it more squarely on the officer. 
Second, a standard such as that promulgated by the Caballes Court 
unnecessarily exposes society’s disadvantaged members to racial, age, 
gender, and economic profiling by police.  As further discussed below, 
the Supreme Court’s decision allows officers to walk a drug-detection 
dog around any lawfully stopped vehicle, but does not require that they 
                                                 
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).  In Terry, the Supreme Court established 
that stopping and frisking an individual was a “‘seizure[]’” and “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, but it was not unreasonable so long as the officer had a 
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the 
individual for a crime.  The officer need not be absolutely certain that 
the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man 
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger.  And in determining whether the officer 
acted reasonably[,] . . . [the officer must be able to point to] specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience. 
Id. at 27 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).  Thus, for these types of searches, probable 
cause is not required, but the Fourth Amendment still requires some level of protection for 
the citizen.  Id. 
4 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. 
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walk the dog around every lawfully stopped vehicle.  This level of 
discretion, not checked by any court-mandated requirement of 
reasonable suspicion, is merely one more weapon in an arsenal to exploit 
anyone against whom an officer feels a conscious or sub-conscious 
prejudice. 
The Court could have reworked, and ultimately applied, its same 
basic reasoning from Kyllo v. United States5 and held that a dog-sniff—
essentially the use of a sensory-enhancement device—constituted a full-
blown search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring 
probable cause of wrongdoing or the procurement of a warrant before 
allowing a trained drug-detection dog to sniff a citizen’s vehicle.6  This 
approach would be problematic for several reasons.  For example, it may 
create an inconsistency by extending the sanctity of the home argument 
from the Kyllo decision to the already de-sanctified automobile. 
Additionally, through analogy, the Court could have considered the 
weight that a drug-detection dog’s alert is given in civil forfeiture of 
contraband cases, where the courts require more than a mere dog-alert to 
sustain a finding of probable cause.  Both civil and criminal laws apply a 
“probable cause” standard to searches when deciding whether law 
enforcement should be granted access to a citizen’s vehicle.  Generally, 
when determining probable cause, the civil law does not recognize a 
dog-alert by itself as sufficient to merit the probable cause necessary to 
support seizure, and ultimately forfeiture, of a citizen’s personal 
possessions.  On the other hand, the criminal law, through Caballes, 
considers a dog-alert enough to meet probable cause to invade 
someone’s private space, regardless of whether there is reason to believe 
that contraband is hidden in a vehicle.  To effectuate a more coherent 
approach to probable cause, either the standard for probable cause 
meriting seizure should be relaxed, or the standard for showing probable 
cause meriting a search should be heightened. 
As further discussed in this Article, raising the required standard for 
probable cause would appropriately meet both the government’s 
interest—preventing the movement of illegal contraband—and the 
interest of citizens—protecting individual privacy rights.  Treating a 
dog-sniff as a “vehicular frisk” would best balance the important 
government interest of preventing drug-trafficking and a citizen’s 
                                                 
5 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36, 34–37 (2001) (holding that both the use of 
sensory enhancing devices and inferences drawn from them are searches pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment, where a sensory-enhancement device was directed at a citizen’s 
personal dwelling because it exposed “intimate details” from inside the person’s home). 
6 See id. at 34–37. 
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fundamental, constitutional right of protection against unreasonable 
searches. 
II.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF AND AGAINST THE CABALLES 
HOLDING 
In order to understand the seemingly inconsistent, ill-supported, and 
intrusive standard adopted by the Supreme Court, one must reflect on 
the policy considerations that have led to the current standard.  Drug-
detecting dogs are often used to combat a rampant drug-trade.7  Thus, 
even though the police cannot corroborate whether a drug-detection 
police dog is actually alerting to drugs before conducting a search 
pursuant to the alert, the dog is generally considered to be a reliable 
source of information about illicit activity.8  Yet, despite the general 
acceptance of trained-dog alerts as reliable, courts rarely rely solely on 
that one indication of illegal narcotics activity to establish probable cause 
to merit seizure of money for forfeiture purposes, even when the person 
whose money is being seized may be arrested for some other criminal 
violation.9  For example, the court in Jones interpreted the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act to mean that “a positive alert by a drug dog 
to narcotics on currency, standing alone, does not constitute evidence 
that the money was used in a drug transaction[]” because, even though 
there were also marijuana stems and seeds found in his vehicle, the 
money could not actually be linked to any drug transaction.10  In the 
context of probable cause meriting forfeiture of personal possessions, the 
Jones court stated that a dog alert does not, without more, create a link to 
illicit drug activity. 
On the other hand, police need to establish probable cause in order 
to search a suspicious individual, because, through the Fourth 
Amendment, each American citizen is granted freedom from 
unreasonable searches, where the notion of “search” is to be determined 
                                                 
7 See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Evidence Considered in Tracing Currency, Bank 
Account, or Cash Equivilancy to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or Declaration 
as Contraband, Under State Law—Odor of Drugs, 116 A.L.R. 5th 325, 325 (2004). 
8 Although it is a negatively-reviewed minority view, Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 
505 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), put so much weight on the alert of a drug-
detecting dog that the court explained “[a]n alert by a trained, experienced narcotics 
dog[] . . . is in itself enough to establish probable cause for an arrest, that [a] chapter 893 
[Florida statute stating that contraband goods are subject to forfeiture] violation has 
occurred . . . .”  Id. 
9 See Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
10 Id. 
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with reference to a person’s expectation of privacy,11 so long as society 
deems that expectation reasonable.12  In situations in which police gather 
information to obtain probable cause to search a home, the Supreme 
Court has upheld the reasonable expectation of privacy at its highest, 
ruling that certain attempts to obtain the requisite information to merit 
probable cause constituted searches in themselves.13 
Although the policy of protecting a citizen’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the home has been steadfastly upheld via the Fourth 
Amendment, the expectation of privacy protected by the United States 
Supreme Court regarding automobiles14 has been so eroded that one 
Fourth Amendment scholar, when explaining the expectation of privacy 
                                                 
11 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (speaking of 
subjective expectation). 
12 See generally id.  Hence, lacking a reasonable expectation of privacy, a question of 
reasonableness of the search cannot even arise, in default of the very constitutive elements 
of the notion of “search.”  Id. 
13 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that gaining probable cause for a 
search warrant by obtaining information through the use of sense-enhancing technology 
regarding the interior of the home, which could not have been obtained without physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment—at least where the technology in question is not in general public use); see 
also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980).  This case states: 
 It is a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” that searches 
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.  Yet is [sic] is also well settled that objects such as 
weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the 
police without a warrant.  The seizure of property in plain view 
involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, 
assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with 
criminal activity. 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 586–87 (footnote omitted).  But see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986).  The Court held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when he puts up a fence around his yard, where police observe, with the naked eye, from a 
low-flying airplane, that he is committing illegal acts in his backyard.  Id.  In such a case, 
the person’s activities are visible to the naked eye.  Id.  “What a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”  Id.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
14 See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).  Belton was pulled over for 
speeding, and was taken outside of the car away from the vehicle.  Id. at 456.  He was 
handcuffed and arrested, leaving no opportunity for him to either get something from the 
car or destroy any evidence.  Id.  The police then searched the car, found a coat inside the 
car, opened his coat pocket, and found cocaine.  Id.  Belton was later indicted for possession 
of a controlled substance, and the United States Supreme Court held that the search 
without a warrant was reasonable, even though the vehicle was secured by the police.  Id.  
The Court reasoned that the expectation of privacy in a vehicle is low.  Id. at 457.  See also 
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (creating a bright-line rule that officers can search an 
arrested person’s vehicle at their police station, without showing probable cause for a 
warrant, regardless of the fact that they could have easily obtained a warrant to search the 
car, based on probable cause that evidence was inside the car). 
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in a vehicle to her criminal procedure class, describes driving in a car as, 
“skidding off the face of the Fourth Amendment.”15 
When considering the Fourth Amendment constitutional rights of a 
citizen in a vehicle, Supreme Court cases mainly focus on the reduced 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle when probable cause existed to obtain 
a search warrant.  Based primarily on the effect of the reduced 
expectation of vehicle privacy rights, the United States Supreme Court 
recently and ominously held in Caballes that allowing a drug-sniffing dog 
to smell around a car during a routine traffic stop, where an arrest would 
not be warranted under the law, did not constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, and was merely a valid way of obtaining probable 
cause to search a vehicle for contraband.16 
The Supreme Court deftly carved a distinction between Caballes and 
past cases, such as Kyllo,17 based on the differences between privacy 
expectations in a house versus in a car.  This is especially true 
considering the difference between the potentially lawful activities that 
the use of sensory-enhancing equipment could have exposed in Kyllo18 
                                                 
15 Interview with Professor Amy D. Ronner, St. Thomas University School of Law 
(October, 2005). 
16 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005). 
17 Id. at 409.  The Court explained as follows:   
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the 
use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a 
home constituted an unlawful search . . . .  The legitimate expectation 
that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is 
categorically distinguishable from [Caballes]’s hopes or expectations 
concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. 
Id. at 409–10 (citations omitted). 
18 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38–39.  The Supreme Court recently explained the “intimate 
details” which could be exposed through the use of sense-enhancing technology, and the 
reason the prohibition of thermal imaging was necessary: 
Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to “intimate details” 
would not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in 
application, failing to provide “a workable accommodation between 
the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment[.]”  To begin with, there is no necessary connection 
between the sophistication of the surveillance equipment and the 
“intimacy” of the details that it observes—which means that one 
cannot say (and the police cannot be assured) that use of the relatively 
crude equipment at issue here will always be lawful.  The Agema 
Thermovision 210 [the heat-sensing device used by the law 
enforcement officers] might disclose, for example, at what hour each 
night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail 
that many would consider “intimate”; and a much more sophisticated 
system might detect nothing more intimate than the fact that someone 
left a closet light on.  We could not, in other words, develop a rule 
approving only that through-the-wall surveillance which identifies 
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(although marijuana was found in Kyllo) and the illegal activity that took 
place in Caballes.  In fact, one recent Florida case,19 upon remand by the 
Supreme Court so as to reconsider its holding in light of the Caballes 
decision, held that when a drug-dog was taken to the front of a citizen’s 
house and alerted to the house, the police officer had conducted a 
warrantless search and, thus, violated the Fourth Amendment.20  This 
holding, considered in light of Caballes and Kyllo, must already be seen as 
placing a limitation on, or carving out an exception to, the Caballes 
holding, on the basis that the expectation of privacy in a house is much 
greater than that in a vehicle.21 
The Caballes Court tried to rationalize searching the defendant’s car 
based on the resulting discovery of drugs in the car, but the Court 
ignored the results garnered by the search in Kyllo, where drugs were 
also found.  In an effort to differentiate the cases, the Court concluded, 
“[t]he legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful 
activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from 
[Caballes]’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of 
contraband in the trunk of his car.”22 
Does an innocent citizen have a reasonable expectation that his 
lawful activities will remain private when he steps into a vehicle?  In 
reality, does the above quotation answer that question?  The quotation 
above is a legal slight-of-hand, which should not be allowed to confuse 
the protection against unreasonable searches with the protection of the 
home.  Although, for allegedly clear policy reasons,23 different 
expectations of privacy exist between a vehicle and a house, it is a 
                                                                                                             
objects no smaller than 36 by 36 inches, but would have to develop a 
jurisprudence specifying which home activities are “intimate” and 
which are not.  And even when (if ever) that jurisprudence were fully 
developed, no police officer would be able to know in advance whether 
his through-the-wall surveillance picks up “intimate” details—and 
thus would be unable to know in advance whether it is constitutional. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
19 See State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
20 See Carl Jones, From the Courts:  Appellate Review, Daily Business Review, Broward, 
September 19, 2005, at A16. 
21 Id. (stating that the dissent argued “the majority was creating a ‘residence exception’ 
in the precedent established by Caballes . . . [although] determining the legality of drug 
dog’s work based on place was not a legal analysis the U.S. Supreme Court had yet 
established.”). 
22 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added). 
23 See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (delineating the policy that 
vehicles may be searched only upon a showing of probable cause, but that they may be 
searched without meeting the warrant requirement because of their heightened mobility 
and the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy, as vehicles are on wheels and 
the use of vehicles is highly regulated by the government).  
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separate policy argument that any innocent citizen should be protected 
from searches that invade that reasonable expectation, however highly or 
lowly courts regard that expectation. 
A. Caballes Exacerbates Potential Police Infringements on the Individual 
Right to Privacy by Giving Too Much Weight to Potentially Inaccurate 
Drug-Detection Dog Alerts 
Due to the nearly pandemic proportions to which the sale and use of 
illegal drugs has grown, the Caballes decision does take an important step 
in helping police stop anyone who is transporting drugs, as it allows 
police to walk a drug-detection dog around a vehicle in the absence of 
probable cause.  However, the holding exposes society’s impoverished 
and underprivileged to potential violations of their constitutional rights. 
Since Caballes, case law can fairly be described as running the gamut 
from unthinking adherence to the Supreme Court’s basic holding to 
defiant differentiation from the Caballes Court’s factual scenario.24  In 
Commonwealth v. Feyenord, the Massachusetts Supreme Court argued that 
the use of a trained narcotics detection dog is both “intimidating” and 
“upsetting” to an innocent person who is stopped by the police,25 
especially because even “[w]ell-trained dogs often ‘alert’ to innocent 
people[,]” as the dissent acknowledged in Caballes.26 
Particularly, in one case, a trained dog alerted to a junior-high school 
girl, who was subsequently strip-searched, only to later find out that the 
dog alerted to her because “the girl had been playing that morning with 
her own dog, who was in heat.”27  Under Caballes, regardless of the 
reason for the dog’s alert, police officers would have probable cause to 
search her vehicle for contraband, despite their failure to show any other 
indication of illicit activity. 
In Caballes, the Supreme Court was clearly privy to information 
showing that trained drug-detection dog alerts are not inherently 
reliable, and Justice Souter went so far as to call the supposed reliability 
of a drug-detection dog a “legal fiction.”28  Justice Souter’s dissent 
analyzed, case-by-case, the reliability of drug-detection dogs in past 
cases and found staggering results:29 
                                                 
24 See generally Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 833 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 2005). 
25 Id. at 607–08. 
26 Id. at 608 n.3 (citing to Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411). 
27 Id. (citing to and discussing Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979)). 
28 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
29 Id.  This Article is not a scientific study, and is merely taking the statistical research of 
the United States Supreme Court as true.  See id.  This Article recognizes that drug-
detection dog accuracy is a hotly debated scientific topic, as well as a legal topic.  See id. 
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The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction.  
Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into 
the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed 
infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-
trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than 
perfect accuracy, whether owing to errors by their 
handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even 
the pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine.  
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 
(C.A.10 1997) (describing a dog that had a 71% accuracy 
rate); United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1378, n. 
3 (C.A.10 1997) (describing a dog that erroneously 
alerted 4 times out of 19 while working for the postal 
service and 8% of the time over its entire career); United 
States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (C.A.7 2001) 
(accepting as reliable a dog that gave false positives 
between 7% and 38% of the time); Laime v. State, 347 Ark. 
142, 159, 60 S.W.3d 464, 476 (2001) (speaking of a dog 
that made between 10 and 50 errors); United States v. 
$242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (C.A.11 2003) (noting that 
because as much as 80% of all currency in circulation 
contains drug residue, a dog alert “is of little value”), 
vacated on other grounds by rehearing en banc, 357 F.3d 
1225 (C.A.11 2004); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 
1214–1217 (C.A.3 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“[A] substantial portion of 
United States currency . . . is tainted with sufficient 
traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine 
to alert to their presence”).30 
Justice Souter did not want to create a per se standard that a drug-
detection dog alert is sufficient to merit probable cause to invade a 
citizen’s privacy, particularly in situations where it has been proven that 
dogs are accurate only half the time, or in some cases, significantly less 
than half the time. 
Should the Court interpret the Fourth Amendment so narrowly as to 
allow for such potential intrusions against the privacy of innocent 
American citizens in the name of compiling evidence to show probable 
cause against a criminal?  Even though the trafficking of contraband is a 
tremendous societal problem, refusing to acknowledge that a dog-sniff 
invokes the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
                                                 
30 Id. at 411–12. 
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searches creates a constitutional harm that tears the societal fabric that 
preventing drug trafficking and other crime is supposed to preserve. 
Initially, it is important to recognize that although different policy 
considerations exist concerning Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it 
relates to both vehicles and homes, these areas of the law do not exist in 
a vacuum, and the logical links that allow them to be evaluated in a 
consistent way must be considered. 
B. The Caballes Holding Creates a New Avenue for Discriminatory Abuse of 
the Poor and Minorities 
As with other cases creating a bright-line Fourth Amendment rule,31 
the Caballes decision is problematic because it subjects the American 
citizen to a method of gathering information, in the pursuit of probable 
cause, that is highly intrusive to the average American and ignores the 
subjective intention of the acting officer.32  Allowing officers to conduct a 
sensory identification of the air around a vehicle,33 and considering an 
alert made pursuant to this sensory identification sufficient to merit 
probable cause to search a vehicle, will undoubtedly lead to abuses 
against anyone that an officer personally desires to harass or specifically 
target, most notably the underprivileged and minorities.34 
The Supreme Court, at least in part, recognized that granting 
discretion to police officers to choose who they investigate could lead, 
and has led, to groundless racial profiling, and, essentially, has led to 
                                                 
31 See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).  The Court asserted 
that, regarding the warrant exception for searches incident to an arrest, officers are not 
required to specifically establish that they are promoting either of the twin-aims that justify 
this bright-line rule, namely either protecting themselves from dangerous objects or finding 
evidence to prove the violation.  Id. at 236.  In fact, the Defendant in Robinson demonstrated 
that no justification existed, under either of the two policy goals of a search incident to 
arrest, to merit searching the Defendant’s car.  Id. at 240.  It follows that, as the search 
incident to arrest can be made without questioning the officer’s subjective intent, the 
opportunity for abusive searches of certain targeted groups is not capable of challenge 
under the Robinson rule.  Id. at 248. 
32 See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (reasserting the Robinson rule—that 
following a bright-line rule which suspends the Fourth Amendment “arises independently 
of a particular officer’s subjective concerns[]”). 
33 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09.  It is only semantically and legally that this is not 
considered to be a search.  According to Caballes, apparently there is not an expectation of 
privacy that society is willing to acknowledge as reasonable.  Id. 
34 See generally Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black:  The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 403, 403–09 (2001).  Ronner argued that “repression[]” of 
deeply buried racist feelings by police officers may lead to Fourth Amendment abuses 
against minorities.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  It seems that the behavior 
leading to Professor Ronner’s concerns is exacerbated when police officers are given too 
much discretion.  Id. 
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categorizing people as potential criminals based on their race.35  Because 
the Court held that “sweep” interrogations did not merit a Fourth 
Amendment violation, Justice Marshall was concerned with, what were 
to him, the obvious collateral effects and abuses caused by allowing 
police free reign to question riders on a bus about their activities and to 
gain consent to search their bags without “articulable suspicion” of 
wrongdoing (i.e., the showing needed to conduct a Terry stop).36  
Although “the police who conduct these sweeps decline to offer a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing[,] . . . ”37  Justice 
Marshall stated, “[i]t does not follow[] . . . that the approach of 
passengers during a sweep is completely random.”38  Exemplifying the 
obvious and dangerous opportunity for abusive police behavior created 
by the recent Caballes decision, “at least one officer who routinely 
confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a factor 
influencing his decision whom to approach.”39 
The Caballes decision should also be considered in light of 
undeniable socioeconomic constraints under which certain factions of 
society function.  Fundamentally leading to more frequent and negative 
police interaction, “African Americans and Hispanics tend to populate 
poor, inner city neighborhoods, which are commonly known to be high 
                                                 
 
35 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441 n.1 (1991).  In Bostick, Justice Marshall states: 
That is to say, the police who conduct these sweeps decline to offer a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing sufficient to 
justify a warrantless “stop” or “seizure” of the confronted passenger.  
It does not follow, however, that the approach of passengers during a 
sweep is completely random.  Indeed, at least one officer who 
routinely confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a 
factor influencing his decision whom to approach. See United States v. 
Williams, No. 1:89CR0135 (ND Ohio, June 13, 1989), p. 3 (“Detective 
Zaller testified that the factors initiating the focus upon the three 
young black males in this case included:  (1) that they were young and 
black . . . .”), aff’d, No. 89-4083 (CA6, Oct. 19, 1990), p. 7 [916 F.2d 714 
(table) ] (the officers “knew that the couriers, more often than not, were 
young black males”), vacated and remanded, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 
1572, 114 L.Ed.2d 74 (1991).  Thus, the basis of the decision to single 
out particular passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to 
be inarticulable than unspeakable. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
36 See generally id. at 441–42. 
37 Id. at 442 n.1. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, No. 1:89CR0135 (N.D. Ohio, June 13, 1989), 
where an officer testified that his reasons for focusing on three black males included that 
they were “young and black”). 
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crime areas.”40  This is not the fault of the average member of a minority 
group but is instead caused by basic societal inequities.41  In support of 
her discussion, in Fleeing While Black, Amy D. Ronner paraphrases 
George C. Galster’s argument in Polarization, Place, and Race to highlight 
the most basic, and terrible, societal constraints imposed upon minority 
groups, namely their everyday environment coupled with the 
disadvantages that constant and widespread racism inflict upon them: 
Members of racial-ethnic minority groups 
disproportionately face an urban opportunity structure 
that substantially constrains their mobility across 
socioeconomic strata.  Some of the most important place-
based constraints include segregated housing; lack of 
positive role models as neighbors; limitations on capital; 
inferior public services; lower quality public education; 
more violent, drug-infested neighborhoods; and 
impaired access to employment and job-related 
information networks.  As if these spatial penalties were 
not enough, racial-ethnic minorities face the additional 
burdens of discrimination in a variety of markets.42 
Common logic dictates that more crime in a specific geographic area 
results in more negative interaction with police and a heightened 
suspicion by those officers, regardless of their good intentions, of anyone 
in those neighborhoods. 
Hypothetically, in Florida, if one-thousand white men in their early 
twenties and one-thousand black men in their early twenties were pulled 
over by police for traffic infractions for which they could not be arrested 
according to state law,43 all of the men could be subjected to a police dog 
                                                 
40 Ronner, supra note 34, at 386 (citing generally to George C. Galster, Polarization, Place, 
and Race, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (1993)). 
41 See id. at 385–88. 
42 Id. at 385 n.18 (citing Galster, supra note 40) (in support of her discussion, in Fleeing 
While Black, Amy D. Ronner paraphrases Galster’s argument in Polarization, Place, and Race 
to highlight some of the most basic and terrible societal constraints imposed upon minority 
groups, namely their everyday environment). 
43 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).  The United States Supreme 
Court has clearly ruled that the Constitution does not prohibit the arrest of a person who is 
pulled over for any traffic violation, even though a state offers more protection to its 
citizens.  Id.  The Court held that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless arrest for a 
minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine, 
so long as there is probable cause that the violation has been committed.  Id.  But see FLA. 
STAT. § 316.1923 (2005) (mandating that “[a]ggressive careless driving,” alone, is not an 
arrestable offense, and, thus, raising the standard for a traffic arrest in Florida above the 
constitutionally protected floor) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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sniffing the outside of their car for the scent of illegal contraband, at the 
discretion of the officer.  Although this hypothetical does not, in itself, 
lead to a risk of Fourth Amendment reasonableness violations against 
minority groups, it demonstrates a situation ripe for unreasonable police 
action, particularly when considered alongside substantial statistical 
evidence that “race is a significant factor in pretextual traffic stops[]”44 
and that the vast majority of motorists stopped are drivers of color, even 
though drivers of color constitute only a miniscule percentage of total 
drivers.45 
Considering these statistics, it can reasonably be inferred that the 
majority of people who suffer from a lowered expectation of privacy in a 
vehicle, and ultimately suffer from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement 
of such a low standard to show probable cause to search a vehicle—
namely a mere police-dog alert—are, and will be, non-white, Black, and 
Hispanic Americans. 
Although the Supreme Court has come to many decisions that have 
helped minorities,46 this is not the first Supreme Court holding which 
seems to allow for the railroading of the rights of minorities.47  In one of 
                                                 
44 Ronner, supra note 34, at 387 n.24 (summarization of research by and citing to Angela 
J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 431–32 (1997)). 
45 Id. at 387 (citing to Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 
431–32).  Davis cites to research that exemplifies the racial turmoil being exacerbated by the 
slackening enforcement of the Fourth Amendment: 
[L]awsuits filed by black motorists in New Jersey and Maryland reveal 
that 71 percent of the 437 motorists stopped and searched along a 
northeastern stretch of Interstate 95 in the first nine months of 1995 
were black.  One hundred and forty-eight hours of videotaped traffic 
stops in Florida revealed that seventy percent of the 1,048 motorists 
stopped along Interstate 95 were black or Hispanic, even though 
Blacks and Hispanics made up only five percent of the drivers on that 
stretch of the highway.  Less than one percent of the drivers received 
traffic citations and only five percent of the stops resulted in an arrest. 
Id. (quoting Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. at 431-32) 
(footnotes omitted). 
46 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249–50 (1964) 
(upholding the authority of the federal government to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
in hotel desegregation, despite claims made both by segregationists and strict-
interpretation constitutional scholars that the Commerce Clause should not be used to 
promote desegregation). 
47 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).  The Court allowed 
for lower-income housing to be based out of specific areas, explaining: 
With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the 
development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the 
coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in 
destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such 
sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed 
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive 
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the clearest legal attempts to help American minorities, in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as constitutional when applying desegregation to 
commercial interests, such as hotels.48  This was a difficult decision, as it 
required an arguably creative reading of the Commerce Clause.49  On the 
other hand, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court 
determined that zoning against “apartment houses[]” should be allowed 
because the apartment building, and inferably, that which it brings, is 
“often . . . a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the 
open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential 
character of the district.”50  The Court went so far as to prophesize that 
the introduction of apartment buildings negatively affects the single-
family areas until “finally, the residential character of the neighborhood 
and its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly 
destroyed.”51  The Supreme Court may have been rationally concerned 
about the effects of introducing apartment buildings into single-family 
neighborhoods, and it is possible that the Court did not specifically 
consider the effect that this decree would have on the rights of 
minorities.  However, as George Galster wrote in Polarization, Place, and 
Race,52 the socioeconomic realities of American minorities lead them to 
live in inexpensive housing, thus resulting in the type of heightened 
societal segregation, which was created—justifiably or not—by the 
landmark Village of Euclid decision.53 
                                                                                                             
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.  
Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others, 
interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and 
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the 
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the 
disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the 
occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger 
portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving 
children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by 
those in more favored localities—until, finally, the residential character 
of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached 
residences are utterly destroyed. 
Id. 
48 See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 241. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 
states, “[Congress shall have the power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”  Id. 
50 See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394. 
51 Id. 
52 See Ronner, supra note 34, at 385 (citing Galster, supra note 40). 
53 See generally Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (holding that the creation of zoning districts 
for different types of land uses was constitutional). 
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Unlike the brave,54 but controversial, application of the Commerce 
Clause in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., the Caballes Court could have more 
easily looked toward the future effects of its ruling and to further a 
system of law enforcement which would have limited opportunity for 
police abuses, especially against those already oppressed by their 
economic situation and racial background.55  Although the Supreme 
Court could have easily held that dog-sniffs pursuant to a non-arrestable 
traffic stop constitute warrantless searches through the use of sensory-
enhancing technology, as it held in Kyllo,56 the Caballes Court instead 
opened the door for further abuse of the rights of minorities.  Minorities 
are already disproportionately victims of traffic stops.57  Because the 
Court failed to recognize the use of trained police dogs as a search and 
instead authorized such a highly intrusive mechanism for obtaining 
probable cause, when faced with a situation where there is a lack of 
racial compassion, these same profiled and abused minorities will face 
officers who carry one more high-tech weapon in their arsenal. 
In these Caballes-like situations, officers can randomly decide to walk 
a contraband-detection dog around a citizen’s car, even when the citizen 
is cooperative during a minor traffic stop.  Based on actual admissions of 
past racial profiling abuses by police officers,58 the threat of racial abuse 
clearly exists.  The Court should not continue facilitating this abuse of 
minorities by creating new abuse-ripe precedent that grants officers even 
more discretion in picking random targets that are not actually 
“completely [racially] random.”59  Instead, the Court should require a 
reasonable basis for selecting targets, in a way that protects poor and 
minority citizens and does not leave them vulnerable to persecution 
based on nothing more “articulable”60 than skin color. 
                                                 
54 Just like the ruling that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to pass the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 may have permanently stunted the positive effects of the civil 
rights movement, Caballes was a brave, risky, and ultimately debatable decision that is 
presently accepted without any serious debate. 
55 See generally Galster, supra note 40. 
56 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
57 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 441-42 (1991). 
58 See id. at 441 n.1.  This footnote cites to several cases supporting this assertion, namely:   
United States v. Williams, No. 1:89CR0135 (ND Ohio, June 13, 1989), p. 3 
([”]Detective Zaller testified that the factors initiating the focus upon 
the three young black males in this case included:  (1) that they were 
young and black . . . .[”]), aff’d, No. 89-4083 (CA6, Oct. 19, 1990), p. 7 
[916 F.2d 714 (table) ] [and] (the officers [‘]knew that the couriers, more 
often than not, were young black males[”]), vacated and remanded, 
500 U.S. 901 (1991). 
Id. (citation omitted). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Considering repeated holdings that the Fourth Amendment does not 
allow for abuse, coupled with the Caballes decision’s allowance of police 
discretion to abuse the poor and other minorities, perhaps Justice 
Marshall best articulated the fear of abuse faced by minorities when he 
stated that the “basis of the decision to single out particular passengers 
during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than 
unspeakable.”61 
C. Considering A Reality-Based Hypothetical Under the Effects of the 
Caballes Holding 
In order to truly appreciate the problems caused by the Caballes 
holding, consider the following hypothetical situation, based loosely on 
an actual case reviewed by the Ninth Circuit in 2000: 
While dropping their friend off at home in an upper-class white suburb, two 
black high school students rode in the front seat of a car that the driver bought 
with money saved from his job coaching baseball at his local Boys and Girls 
Club.  Their white friend sat in the backseat.  After making a legal turn, the boys 
were pulled over by a white police officer.  The officer stated that the car’s tail-
light was malfunctioning and that violation of the traffic code merited giving the 
driver a ticket.  This was a false pretense for making the stop because, as the boys 
knew, the tail-light was working fine.  The officer then looked into the car, and 
as he had only seen the black teenagers in the front seat until that point, asked 
the “[white teen] whether he knew the two black teens, whether they were 
actually his friends, and how long he had known them.”62  Then he asked “the 
two African American teens, ‘[w]hat are you doing out here?’”63  “Here[,]” the 
boys knew, meant a “white” neighborhood.  The officer then said to one of the 
black teenagers, “You’re not supposed to be here.”64  With that, he informed 
them that he was printing out a traffic citation and told them not to move.  The 
officer, while still speaking, led his trained, narcotics-detection dog from the 
patrol car and walked it around the vehicle’s perimeter, where the dog sniffed the 
entire body of the vehicle, never making a noise.  Then, while the officer was 
writing a ticket, his dog indiscriminately barked.  The officer then made the boys 
get out of the car.  He searched the entire vehicle, found nothing suspicious, and 
ordered the boys back into the vehicle.  The officer then shoved the ticket into the 
                                                 
61 Id. at 441, n.1. 
62 Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000).  It should be noted that although 
the quotations in this hypothetical are taken from this historical case, the issues raised in 
the hypothetical are not similar to those of the cited case.  The purpose of using these actual 
quotations is to show that, unfortunately, the possibility for abuses, in many cases, will 
lead to their realization.  Fact, sometimes, as in Price v. Kramer, is more horrible than fiction. 
63 Id. at 1242. 
64 Id. at 1243. 
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driver’s hand.  Before letting the petrified young men leave, “the officer[‘]s last 
words to the boys were, ‘[g]et the hell out of here.’”65 
This aforementioned scenario, police officer’s language, and 
fabricated reason for the traffic stop are based on an actual case of 
abusive police conduct, which was deemed a Fourth Amendment 
violation.66  Although the actual case involved an illegal use of force 
against the citizens by the officer,67 merely substituting that illegal use of 
force with a now-legal police dog-sniff and subsequent vehicular search 
exemplifies the opportunity for highly intrusive and subjective police 
conduct.  This should have been reasonably anticipated by the Supreme 
Court as an unavoidable result of its most recent articulation of the law 
delineating whether a trained, drug-alerting dog’s sniff constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.68  But for allowing the dog to sniff 
the vehicle, the stop would have been much less intrusive on the young 
citizens’ right to privacy. 
III.  ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED “VEHICULAR FRISK” STANDARD AND 
THE POTENTIAL RATIONALES FOR AND EFFECTS OF A DIFFERENT SUPREME 
COURT RULING IN CABALLES 
As stated in the Introduction,69 Caballes could have been decided 
many different ways, for many different reasons.  At least some of these 
alternative decisions more appropriately balance the interests of both the 
government and individuals when viewed in light of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
A. The Full-Blown Search Alternative:  Application of the Kyllo Reasoning 
and Problems With Extending It to Vehicles 
The Caballes Court could have ruled differently had it adopted its 
Kyllo reasoning and held that a dog-sniff constituted a full-blown search 
as a sensory-enhancement device pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court could have required probable cause before ever allowing a 
trained drug-detection dog to sniff a citizen’s vehicle.  Although 
adopting Kyllo may lead to a more fair result, as discussed below, this 
approach would be problematic for many reasons. 
As stated earlier in this Article, although the trafficking of 
contraband is a tremendous societal problem, refusing to acknowledge a 
                                                 
65 Id. at 1251. 
66 See generally id. 
67 Id. 
68 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005). 
69 See supra Parts I–II. 
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dog-sniff as triggering the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches creates a constitutional harm that tears the 
societal fabric that preventing drug trafficking, and other crime, is 
supposed to preserve.  If the Caballes Court had merely applied Kyllo’s 
analysis70 to an officer initiating a dog-sniff around a vehicle when no 
articulable suspicion of contraband or “[crime] afoot[]”71 existed, it 
would have avoided entirely the possibility of exacerbating the already 
rampant abuse of the rights of minorities by discretionary police action.  
The Court decided otherwise, taking a different and equally extreme 
route.  American citizens, particularly minorities, will now wake up in a 
United States where they will feel more susceptible to police abuse.  The 
level of protection afforded to an American citizen when stopped for a 
traffic violation did not have to diminish as it did through Caballes, and, 
most importantly, does not have to stay that way. 
The Supreme Court could have rationalized ruling differently in a 
variety of ways, such as by creating a different standard for vehicular 
dog-sniffs that required, either, probable cause based on the Kyllo 
standard72 or reasonable suspicion based on the Terry v. Ohio standard.73  
                                                 
70 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
71 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).  The Court held as follows: 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating 
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes 
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the 
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ 
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area 
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in 
evidence against the person from whom they were taken. 
Id. 
72 See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27. 
73 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13–14.  Terry concludes that only reasonable suspicion is 
necessary to stop and investigate a person because the Fourth Amendment guards against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, not every search and seizure: 
 The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of 
judicial control.  It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products 
of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that much 
conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon 
constitutional protections.  Moreover, in some contexts the rule is 
ineffective as a deterrent.  Street encounters between citizens and 
police officers are incredibly rich in diversity.  They range from wholly 
friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutually useful information to 
hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or 
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For example, the Court could have simply applied the Kyllo holding and, 
analogous to similar precedent, found that the dog-sniff was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.74  However, as discussed further below, 
the Caballes Court found the reasoning in Kyllo problematic because it 
categorizes a dog-sniff as a full-blown search, thus bringing it under the 
most intense Fourth Amendment scrutiny and providing free reign of 
the roadways to drug traffickers.75 
B. Potential Problems With Finding That the Caballes Dog-Sniff Is a Search 
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment 
First, it should be noted that there was substantial precedent, other 
than Kyllo, for finding that the Caballes dog-sniff was impermissible 
under the Fourth Amendment.  In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the 
Court held that police checkpoints, where drug-detection canines were 
led around vehicles in pursuit of obtaining probable cause of illegal 
activity, constituted Fourth Amendment violations.76  Due to the 
randomness of checkpoints and the lack of actual suspicion, the 
checkpoints were deemed impermissible, and the Court explained:  
“When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime 
control purposes at checkpoints such as here, . . . stops can only be justified 
by some quantum of individualized suspicion.”77  Although the reasoning 
applied in Edmond was applicable to the Caballes situation, the scenarios 
were sufficiently different to determine that the expectation of privacy 
for a citizen stopped at a fully random checkpoint and a citizen lawfully 
stopped due to a traffic violation should be evaluated separately. 
                                                                                                             
loss of life.  Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece.  
Some of them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a 
different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into the 
conversation.  Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety 
of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to 
prosecute for crime.  Doubtless some police “field interrogation” 
conduct violates the Fourth Amendment.  But a stern refusal by this 
Court to condone such activity does not necessarily render it 
responsive to the exclusionary rule. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
74 See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27. 
75 See id. at 34 (holding “that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without 
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least 
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”) (citation omitted). 
76 See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (declaring that random 
police checkpoints where drug-detection canines were randomly led around police-
stopped vehicles, in pursuit of obtaining probable cause of illegal activity, was a Fourth 
Amendment violation, as there was no reasonable suspicion of the people being stopped). 
77 Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
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The Caballes Court seems to hone in on what the State’s brief argues 
is “the fundamental distinction under the Fourth Amendment between 
homes and cars.”78  “As the [Kyllo] Court explained, because ‘all details 
[in the home] are intimate details,’ a reasonable expectation of privacy 
lies in all aspects of the home that would otherwise remain 
concealed[.]”79  “In so holding, however, the Court emphasized that the 
‘firm’ and ‘bright’ line it drew ‘at the entrance to the house[]’80 would not 
apply to other places, ‘such as automobiles[.]’”81  The State summarized 
its argument against applying Kyllo to Caballes by stating, “[i]n cars and 
other places outside the home, not all details are intimate details, and 
thus all do not fall within the reasonable expectation of privacy.”82 
If the Supreme Court had found that a search pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment had taken place when a dog-sniff was conducted outside a 
car, the only time that a dog-sniff could be used by police to locate drugs 
would be when an officer already had probable cause to believe that a 
person inside the stopped vehicle had committed a crime or was in 
possession of contraband based on other factors.  This would greatly 
reduce the usefulness of trained drug-detection dogs for determining 
whether a person was in possession of contraband, because, generally, if 
the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle, the officer would be 
able to visibly locate the contraband. 
Additionally, if a trained drug-detection dog could only be used 
when an officer already had probable cause to search a vehicle, the goals 
of lowering the expectation of privacy when an automobile is the subject 
of a search would likely be frustrated.83  The “automobile exception to 
the Fourth Amendment[] warrant requirement[]” exists because, without 
the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle, if the officer was 
required to obtain a warrant to search a vehicle, an automobile carrying 
evidence of a crime or contraband could be moved out of the jurisdiction 
of the officers and evidence could be lost.84  The justifications for this 
diminished expectation of privacy stem from the fact that the driver is in 
plain view, the government highly regulates driving, cars travel through 
public thoroughfares, and cars must be registered by the government.85 
                                                 
78 Reply Brief for the Petitioner at *5, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (2004 WL 
2398459 (October 22, 2004)) [hereinafter State’s Brief]. 
79 Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–38). 
80 Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40). 
81 Id. (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34) (citation omitted). 
82 Id. 
83 See generally California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
84 See id at 388. 
85 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303–04 (1999).  The Supreme Court identified 
factors which contributed to the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle, stating: 
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Applied to the Caballes scenario, where police officers are trying to 
gain probable cause to make that search, if the Supreme Court had ruled 
that the dog-sniff was a search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, 
police officers would be stripped of one of their main weapons in 
obtaining probable cause for fighting drug-distribution.86  Although 
Richard Nixon’s “war on drugs[]”87 admittedly still needs to be fought, 
the government’s abuse of the American citizenry in order to effectuate 
this goal cannot continue to be ruled legally acceptable.  Because of the 
need to classify drug-detection dog’s use as something other than a 
Fourth Amendment search, the Court should create a new category of 
“vehicular frisks” applicable to Caballes scenarios.  This intermediate 
standard, falling between the current, abuse-ripe lack of a standard for 
the use of a drug-dog and the standard which requires full-blown 
probable cause pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, could provide a 
higher level of protection to abused classes of Americans and also give 
police officers the bounded discretion they need to determine whether 
suspicious individuals are in possession of contraband. 
C. The Low Weight Given to Dog-Sniffs in Civil Forfeiture Cases Compared to 
the Substantial Weight Given to Dog-Sniffs in Ascertaining the Probable 
Cause Needed to Invade Citizens’ Privacy Is Contradictory and Troubling 
When deciding Caballes, the Supreme Court could have considered, 
by analogy, the weight that a drug-detection dog’s alert is given in civil 
forfeiture cases to help decide that more than a mere dog-alert should be 
required for finding probable cause to search a person’s vehicle.  As 
previously stated, both civil and criminal law apply the same probable 
                                                                                                             
 Even if the historical evidence, as described by Ross, were thought 
to be equivocal, we would find that the balancing of the relative 
interests weighs decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a 
passenger’s belongings.  Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a 
reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they 
transport in cars, which “trave[l] public thoroughfares[] seldom serv[e] 
as . . . the repository of personal effects[]”are subjected to police stop 
and examination to enforce “pervasive” governmental controls “[a]s 
an everyday occurrence[]” and, finally, are exposed to traffic accidents 
that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny. 
 . . . . 
 Whereas the passenger’s privacy expectations are, as we have 
described, considerably diminished, the governmental interests at 
stake are substantial. 
Id. (citations omitted) 
86 See generally California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that a warrant is not 
required to search a container, package, or compartment—including the trunk—within a 
vehicle provided that there is probable cause to believe that there is contraband in the vehicle). 
87 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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cause standard to gain access to search a citizen’s vehicle, but when 
determining whether illicit activity has occurred by a preponderance of 
the evidence, civil law does not recognize a dog-alert alone as sufficient 
to merit forfeiture of a citizen’s personal possessions. 
Generally, and with one particularly noteworthy88 and hotly 
disputed89 exception, there is a higher threshold in civil cases for proving 
probable cause meriting the forfeiture of money used in the purchase or 
sale of contraband goods, than for establishing probable cause to search 
a citizen’s vehicle under the Caballes standard in both civil and criminal 
cases.90  In Florida, where during a traffic stop a police officer seizes 
money solely because he is alerted to it by a drug-sniffing dog, courts 
have generally followed the national consensus91 that a canine’s alert, 
without the fulfillment of other factors,92 does not establish the requisite 
                                                 
88 See Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 505 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  
Lobo held that, based on the totality of the circumstances, seizure and forfeiture of the 
appellant’s money was proper, although the court explained that “[a]n alert by a trained, 
experienced narcotics dog[] . . . is in itself enough to establish probable cause for an arrest, 
that [a] chapter 893 [Florida statute stating that contraband goods are subject to forfeiture] 
violation has occurred[,] and that the [alerted to] money is itself strong evidence that it was 
involved in a drug transaction.”  Id.  This interpretation of probable cause for seizure is 
particularly troublesome for residents of Miami-Dade County and the Florida Keys because 
this highly irregular and criticized case precedent is binding in Florida’s Third Appellate 
District.  Id. at 625. 
89 See Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (criticizing Lobo and stating that “[g]enerally, a positive alert by a drug 
dog to narcotics on currency, standing alone, does not constitute evidence that the money 
was used in a drug transaction.”). 
90 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). 
91 See 167 A.L.R. Fed. 365 § 25(b).  Although this is a statute-based standard, most cases 
require probable cause based on a totality of the circumstances test, which a trained, drug-
detection dog alert, alone, does not meet. 
92 See id.  In a discussion of United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency Totaling $14,665, 33 F. 
Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 1998), the article states: 
the court found that the government failed to demonstrate that it had 
probable cause to institute a forfeiture proceeding against nearly 
$15,000 in currency bundled with rubber bands and carried in suitcase 
by a young man who was a member of an ethnic minority, who was 
nervous and upset when the airport security guard asked him to open 
his briefcase, who initially forgot the combination to his briefcase, who 
purchased his ticket in cash the day of the flight, for a stay of four days 
in Las Vegas, who explained that he intended to use the money to put 
a down payment on a home, and who did not have the telephone 
number of the friend that he was planning on meeting in Las Vegas, 
notwithstanding that a trained narcotics dog alerted positively for the 
presence of narcotics on the seized currency; the claimant’s story about 
source of the money was reasonable and largely confirmed, the 
claimant did not have criminal record, was not shown to have had 
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probable cause to seize and forfeit the money.93  However, during a 
lawful traffic stop, which can be based on nothing more than “reasonable 
suspicion” of illegal activity,94 as well as on a minor and non-arrestable 
traffic infraction, the mere alert of a narcotics-detection dog when used 
to “sniff” around the exterior of the motorist’s vehicle, is not considered 
a search and is sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle 
for contraband.95  This dichotomy in showing probable cause is not only 
inconsistent, but is unfair.  The events of Caballes could have easily been 
ruled unconstitutional based on the Fourth Amendment right to 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,96 but the Court 
did not agree. 
One way to examine the Caballes decision would be to recognize that 
the probable cause requirement to search someone’s car should maintain 
some conformity with applicable precedent when viewed from a big-
picture vantage point, specifically in relation to the civil standard for 
seizure and forfeiture.  To effectuate this logical approach to probable 
cause, either the standard for probable cause meriting seizure and 
forfeiture should be relaxed, or the standard for showing probable cause 
meriting a search should be heightened. 
Raising the standard for probable cause warranting a vehicular 
search makes the most sense and best promotes a system of law 
enforcement where individual rights are appropriately respected.  The 
Fourth Amendment specifically protects citizens against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  This has been interpreted to mean that a search 
should not take place without official approval, such as through the 
issuance of a warrant, unless there are particular circumstances which 
make obtaining a warrant unreasonable.  Considering the constitutional 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the harm in 
depriving an American citizen of his or her liberty through a highly 
invasive search should be more difficult to inflict than the harm in 
depriving the same citizen of a material possession. 
                                                                                                             
personal relationships with drug dealers and was truthful with the 
police. 
Id.  Thus, if the dog alert alone were sufficient to merit probable cause for seizure and 
forfeiture, the other factors would not have been considered, and the totality test would not 
be applied when considering 21 U.S.C. § 881.  Id. 
93 Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001). 
94 Ronner, supra note 34, at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410. 
96 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated[] . . . .”); see also Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410–413 (Souter, J., dissenting); State’s Brief, 
supra note 78, at 1 (citing to the Respondent’s Brief). 
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Expounding on the above analysis, both the Florida and federal 
forfeiture standards97 are based on similarly worded statutes which 
allow the seizure of contraband that can reasonably be linked to drug 
transactions.  The State of Florida codified what items may be considered 
“contraband[]” and seized for forfeiture.98  These “[c]ontraband 
article[s]”99 include currency “that was used, was attempted to be used, 
or was intended to be used” in a drug transaction.100  This statute calls 
for the application of a “totality of the facts” test when determining 
whether probable cause existed to support a “nexus . . . between the 
[money] seized and the narcotics activity,”101 although the statute also 
points out that the use of the contraband article does not have to “be 
traced to a specific narcotics transaction.”102 
As applied, courts have interpreted this standard as requiring a 
significant showing of facts indicating illicit activity for seizure and 
forfeiture to be granted.103  Although “probable cause [to seize money] 
                                                 
97 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)(2000) states, in pertinent part: 
(a) Subject property [to seizure and forfeiture:] 
 The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States 
and no property right shall exist in them: 
 . . . . 
 (6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things 
of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in 
exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of 
this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all 
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be 
used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter. 
Id. 
98 See State of Florida Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Holguin, 909 So. 
2d 956, 958-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that there was sufficient probable cause 
that “seized money was used for the sale and/or purchase of contraband, based on the 
totality of the circumstances.”).  The case also quoted FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.701(a)(1) 
(2007).  The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act provides, in pertinent part: 
 (a) “Contraband Article” means: 
1. Any . . . currency . . . that was used, was attempted to be used, or 
was intended to be used in violation of any provision of chapter 
893 . . . if the totality of the facts presented by the state is clearly 
sufficient to meet the state’s burden of establishing probable cause to 
believe that a nexus exists between the article seized and the narcotics 
activity, whether or not the use of the contraband article can be traced 
to a specific narcotics transaction. 
Id. at 958. 
99 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.701(a) (West 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
100 Id. at § 932.701(a)(1). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See generally Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
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can be established [merely through] . . . circumstantial evidence[,]”104 
when seizing money found in a legally searched vehicle, courts have 
considered an extensive list of factors including, but not exclusively 
limited to, the following: 
1. A smell of drugs emanating from inside the car,105 
2. An alert made to the money by a drug-detecting police dog,106 
3. Whether any illegal drugs were found within a reasonable 
proximity of the money,107 
4. Whether the suspect made any admission to recent drug use,108 
5. Whether the money was wrapped in a manner consistent with 
drug dealing (such as separated by denomination and wrapped 
in rubber bands),109 and 
6. Whether the suspect or suspects gave unbelievable, proven 
unreliable, or conflicting stories as to the source of the money.110 
In one of the more recent cases addressing this issue, State of Florida 
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Holguin,111 Judge Angel 
A. Cortiñas reiterated the rule that “[w]hile each one of these facts, 
standing alone, may be insufficient to meet the State’s probable cause 
burden, . . . the aggregation of facts based on the totality of the 
circumstances is legally sufficient to satisfy the State’s burden.”112 
Although the standard meriting probable cause for seizure is flexible 
based on the facts presented, Florida courts almost exclusively hold113 
                                                 
104 Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 505 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  See also 
Jones, 780 So. 2d at 951 (also stating that “[p]robable cause for forfeiture may be established 
by circumstantial evidence[] . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
105 See id.; see also Fitzgerald v. Metro-Dade County, 508 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987). 
106 See State Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Holguin, 909 So. 2d 956, 959 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see also Fitzgerald, 508 So. 2d at 747; Jones, 780 So. 2d at 949. 
107 See Jones, 780 So. 2d at 954.  Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court found 
that the police officer lacked probable cause to seize $13,000 in cash currency during an 
vehicle stop, where the drug dog did not alert to the money until after the cash was 
removed from driver's possession and in police custody, marijuana seeds found under the 
vehicle seat were so insignificant that the officer did not arrest the driver for possession or 
attempt to retrieve the marijuana particles, and the driver's explanation regarding the cash 
was not inconsistent.  Id.  The court determined that no probable cause existed to show that 
the money found inside the car was “used or intended to be used in drug offenses.”  Id. 
108 See Holguin, 909 So. 2d at 956. 
109 See id.; see also Fitzgerald, 508 So. 2d at 747; Jones, 780 So. 2d at 949; Lobo, 505 So. 2d at 
621. 
110 Lobo, 505 So. 2d at 623. 
111 Holguin, 909 So. 2d at 956. 
112 Id. at 959 (deriving its reasoning from Lobo, 505 So. 2d at 623 and Fitzgerald, 508 So. 2d 
at 750). 
113 See generally Lamboy v. Metro-Dade Police Dep’t, 757 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991); see also In re Forfeiture of $37,388.00, 571 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).  But see 
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that a reliable drug-detecting police dog’s alert, without other factors, 
does not reach the requisite level to show probable cause.114  The only 
case that seemingly decided otherwise115 is highly criticized and should 
be overruled, considering the broad body of sister-circuit case law both 
directly and indirectly bearing against it.116  Even in Dewey, a case where 
drugs were found in the same vehicle as a highly suspicious amount of 
money,117 a Florida court held that, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, insufficient probable cause existed to seize the money.118  
In that case, “[t]he driver was arrested on [an] outstanding warrant[.]”119  
Based on the warrant exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest,120 
the trooper searched the vehicle, found a bag of coins and pad of paper, 
and, in the trunk, “found a brown paper bag with a mason jar inside the 
bag.  There was $13,000 in the bag and jar.”121  He then decided to 
carefully search the inside of the car: 
 A search of the interior of the car revealed a 
marijuana cigarette and several marijuana seeds.  A 
canine unit was called to sniff for narcotics.  The dog 
alerted to the passenger door, the ashtray where the 
seeds were found, and the armrest where the cigarette 
was found.  Upon being placed in the trunk of the car 
without the bag or mason jar therein, the dog did not 
alert to anything.  When the bag and mason jar were 
replaced in the trunk by the trooper, the dog was 
                                                                                                             
Lobo, 505 So. 2d 621.  Although only one case, Jones, directly disagrees with Lobo, close 
examination of cases which have differentiated Lobo shows a disturbing pattern of 
miniscule differences put on a pedestal in order to circumvent the seemingly unreasonable 
bright-line standard that Lobo promulgates. 
114 Jones, 780 So. 2d at 951–52. 
115 See generally Lobo, 505 So. 2d at 621. 
116 See Jones, 780 So. 2d at 951–52. 
117 Id. at 953 (citing, with approval, to Dewey v. Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles, 529 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).  Robinson clearly 
articulated the warrant exception and scope of a search incident to arrest, stating: 
 It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a 
traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  This general exception has historically been formulated 
into two distinct propositions.  The first is that a search may be made 
of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest.  The second 
is that a search may be made of the area within the control of the 
arrestee. 
Id. 
121 Jones, 780 So. 2d at 953. 
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brought back and alerted on the mason jar and the 
money.  The trooper testified that the coins and pad 
were significant in that drug dealers often use pay 
phones and need a pad to record their contacts.   
 The Dewey court . . . . concluded . . . that the 
circumstances created no more than a mere suspicion of 
the requisite nexus between the money and criminal 
activity.122 
Based on this body of case law, one can reasonably conclude that in 
order to merit seizure and forfeiture of money through the Florida civil 
law, at a minimum, the state must show that it is more likely than not 
that the particular money seized was used in violation of the Florida 
Contraband Forfeiture Act.123  This standard equates to the state having 
to meet its burden, showing at least by a preponderance of the evidence, 
probable cause to believe that the currency was used in a drug 
transaction. 
Next, looking to the standards for ascertaining probable cause to 
conduct a search, the Supreme Court recently held that during a routine 
traffic stop, allowing a trained drug-alerting police dog to sniff around 
the outside of a motorist’s car was not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment so long as the motorist was not unreasonably delayed.124  In 
Caballes, the Supreme Court justified its decision by stating that “[o]fficial 
conduct that does not ‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is 
not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment.”125  This is a reiteration of 
the Supreme Court’s abiding standard for what constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.126 
First clearly delineated in Katz v. United States,127 the Supreme Court 
ruled that, for Fourth Amendment purposes, a search takes place when 
(1) the person alleging a violation of his constitutional rights exhibits an 
actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) that expectation is one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.128  The Caballes Court 
affirmed its past holdings that “any interest in possessing contraband 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 FLA. STAT. ANN § 932.701. 
124 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (stating that a seizure justified only by the 
issuance of a traffic violation “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time 
reasonably required to complete that mission.”).  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
125 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)). 
126 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. (wording taken from Professor Tamara Lawson, St. Thomas University School of 
Law). 
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cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only 
reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest.’”129 
Discussed later in this Article, the assertion that this government 
conduct only reveals the existence of contraband is extremely 
debatable.130  Thus, it can be inferred, because the alert of the trained 
drug-detecting dog does not constitute a search for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, the dog’s alert, alone, is sufficient to merit probable 
cause to search a vehicle for contraband.  The Caballes Court had to 
wrestle with a highly arguable case, Kyllo, and distinguish (some would 
argue unconvincingly) binding precedent that categorized the use of 
sensory-enhancement equipment as a search governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.131 
In summary, considering that a drug-detecting dog’s alert, alone, is 
sufficient to meet the probable cause requirement to search a vehicle 
when there is no indication of contraband relating to the traffic stop at 
hand, coupled with the fact that the alert of the same police-trained dog 
does not, alone, create probable cause in the civil context for seizure and 
forfeiture of money, it is alarming that the threshold for invasion of a 
potentially innocent motorist’s personal vehicle is lower than the 
standard that the State must meet in order to merely dispossess a citizen 
of a physical possession, such as money.  Even where money is forfeited 
upon a showing that it could reasonably be linked to a drug transaction, 
                                                 
129 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122–23). 
130 See id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
131 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–37 (2001).  Kyllo establishes both that the use 
of sensory enhancing devices and inferences drawn from them are searches pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment by reasoning as follows: 
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area,”  Silverman, 365 U.S., at 512, 81 S.Ct. 
679, constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in 
question is not in general public use.  This assures preservation of that 
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.  On the basis of this criterion, the 
information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the 
product of a search. 
 . . . . 
And, of course, the novel proposition that inference insulates a search 
is blatantly contrary to United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 
3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), where the police “inferred” from the 
activation of a beeper that a certain can of ether was in the home.  The 
police activity was held to be a search, and the search was held 
unlawful. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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the liberty of the money’s owner has not been compromised.  Yet, 
allowing an American citizen’s personal vehicle to be invaded when that 
person is not accused of any illicit activity beyond that meriting a traffic 
stop, creates a probable cause threshold that is so low that a 
malfunctioning canine, reacting to the smell of a female dog in heat, can 
breach it.132 
IV.  CONSIDERING THE MIDDLE GROUND:  APPLICATION OF THE TERRY 
REASONING 
The Supreme Court could have, and should have, ruled that a dog-
sniff was the automotive equivalent to a frisk, and, before allowing the 
police to use a drug-dog to sniff a car, should have required that the 
officer have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that “[crime was] 
afoot[,]” pursuant to Terry v. Ohio.133  This approach would best balance 
the important governmental interest of preventing drug-trafficking and 
the citizen’s fundamental constitutional right of protection against 
unreasonable searches. 
Instead of taking such an extreme stand that may legitimately 
handcuff police from finding contraband through application of the Kyllo 
standard, the Supreme Court could have applied the Terry v. Ohio134 
standard for “reasonable suspicion” as the standard required in order to 
walk a drug-detecting police dog around a vehicle.  This standard would 
equate a drug-dog’s sniffs with the allowable equivalent of a “frisk.”  
The rationale for allowing an officer’s dog to sniff around the outside of 
a vehicle could be similarly equated to the rationale behind allowing a 
police officer to “pat-down” a citizen even though officers do not have 
probable cause to fully search and arrest.  This “vehicular frisk” theory 
creates a middle ground where officers are prohibited from conducting a 
(figurative) random pat-down of a vehicle until they have an “articulable 
suspicion”135 of wrongdoing, so that the citizen is protected from the 
most extreme types of abuses.  On the other hand, affording citizens no 
protection, the Supreme Court has not classified dog-sniffs around a 
vehicle to be a Fourth Amendment search.  Accordingly, no minimal 
standard is imposed on police officers to directly curb abuses, such as by 
limiting race as a reason for invading a citizen’s privacy.  These abuses 
should be curbed, and the indirect effect would be that the probable 
cause standards for civil penalties, like forfeiture, and for the serious 
                                                 
132 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012). 
133 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
134 See id. 
135 Id. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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depravation of physical liberty that searches pursuant to probable cause 
create, would be in more logical conformity with one another. 
V.  LIMITING POTENTIAL FOR POLICE ABUSES AND INCREASING MINORITY 
TRUST:  THE ARGUMENT FOR EQUATING THE CABALLES DOG-SNIFF TO A 
VEHICULAR “FRISK” UNDER THE TERRY V. OHIO STANDARD 
Perhaps the biggest failure in the Caballes Court’s reasoning is that 
the Court seemingly accepts that the reasoning from Kyllo can easily be 
dismissed when looking at vehicle-based cases versus home-based cases 
on the grounds that “[t]he legitimate expectation that information about 
perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically 
distinguishable from [a citizen’s] hopes or expectations concerning the 
nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.”136  The Court ignores 
the big-picture by focusing on one, albeit important, distinction, and it 
ignores that a diminished expectation of privacy does not mean an 
elimination of the citizen’s expectation of privacy. 
The greatest evil that the law should be trying to prevent is abuse of 
the innocent person.  This can be done while still effectively policing 
those who behave unlawfully.  The means for allowing the invasion of 
an individual’s private space, regardless of the person’s comparative 
expectation of privacy between the car and a house, must be carefully 
drawn to be the least intrusive, not the most intrusive.  Justice Souter, in 
his dissent in Caballes, identifies many federal cases in which dog alerts 
were proven to be highly unreliable.137  Additionally, he noted that “a 
study cited by [the State of] Illinois in [Caballes] for the proposition that 
dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs in artificial testing 
situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, 
depending on the length of the search.”138  If the big-picture policy that 
the Court is trying to promote is the protection of the average 
American’s reasonable privacy rights, finding probable cause to search a 
person’s vehicle based solely on a dog-alert which may only have a fifty 
percent chance of being correct139 fails each and every American 
citizen.140  The very real possibility that a dog-alert is only accurate half 
the time141 is probably the reason that the civil courts have almost 
                                                 
136 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005). 
137 Id. at 411–12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (attacking the accuracy of drug-dogs).  See supra 
text accompanying note 30 (citing judicial opinions describing statistical failings of trained 
drug-detection dogs). 
138 Id. at 412 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing to State’s Brief, supra note 78, at 13). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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universally rejected the argument that a dog-alert, alone, merits the 
requisite probable cause to seize a citizen’s currency.142  In his dissent in 
Caballes, Justice Souter best summarized the reason that, in circumstances 
similar to Caballes, a dog-alert should not, alone, be enough to merit 
probable cause to search the person when he argued, “given the 
fallibility of the dog, the sniff is the first step in a process that may 
disclose ‘intimate details’ without revealing contraband, just as a 
thermal-imaging device might do, as described in Kyllo v. United 
States[.]”143 
As discussed earlier, and clearly progressing from Justice Souter’s 
logic, because of the need to classify drug-detection dog use as 
something other than a Fourth Amendment search, courts should create 
a new category of ‘vehicular frisks’ in Caballes scenarios.144  While  
[a]ttempting to analogize this case to Kyllo, [the 
defendant, Caballes] notes that a drug-detection dog, 
like a thermal-imaging device, reveals information about 
an enclosed space that could not otherwise be obtained 
without some physical intrusion.  From this premise, 
[Caballes] maintains that a canine sniff, while not rising 
to the level of a search, may not be conducted without 
some Fourth Amendment justification.145 
This sound argument, despite its rejection in Caballes, hearkens back 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio,146 where the Court first 
delineated the Fourth Amendment standard upon which the over-the-
clothes “frisk” of a suspect could be justified.  Terry held that, upon 
being able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably 
justify an intrusion on an individual’s privacy, an officer may conduct a 
limited search of persons whom he reasonably suspects to be dangerous, 
with the purpose of discovering any weapons that might be used to 
assault the officer or other nearby persons.147  These “Terry Stops” are 
not violative of the Fourth Amendment because they are less invasive 
than entering one’s home or patting down one’s clothing, and the officer 
                                                 
142 See Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 949, 951–52 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (clearly stating that “[g]enerally, a positive alert by a drug dog to 
narcotics on currency, standing alone, does not constitute evidence that the money was 
used in a drug transaction.”). 
143 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 413 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
144 See generally id. at 410–13. 
145 State’s Brief, supra note 78, at *4. 
146 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
147 See id. 
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is required to have articulable facts to justify this less invasive 
intrusion.148 
The application of the Terry analysis to the Caballes scenario was 
argued by Caballes’s amici,149 namely the American Civil Liberties 
Union, which took “Kyllo a step further [than merely arguing that the 
dog-sniff was a search], [by] arguing that a canine sniff is actually a 
‘search,’ albeit one that requires only reasonable suspicion, not probable 
cause.”150  The application of a Terry-type reasonable suspicion standard 
to deciding whether to allow dog-sniffs during a lawful traffic stop 
would allow for the protection of the general public, as a whole, because, 
as was held in Adams v. Williams, the Supreme Court decided that it is 
permissible, under a “Terry Stop,” to stop and frisk an individual 
suspected of having narcotics (and a concealed weapon).151  It could even 
be argued that the presence of narcotics makes it more likely that a 
person would be carrying an illegal firearm, thus making a more direct 
link to the specific reasoning for which the Terry Court ruled that a frisk 
was not a full-blown Fourth Amendment search.  An officer still needs to 
protect himself and others around him from the risk of possible harm 
due to the use of weapons, even though no probable cause exists to 
conduct a full-blown search of a suspicious individual.152  Although it is 
generally an exception to the warrant requirement, the need to conduct a 
cursory “vehicular frisk” could be justified by the same “exigency”153 
argument applied in drug cases such as California v. Carney. 154  In Carney, 
the Court argued that not applying a Fourth Amendment warrant 
exception when dealing with mobile vehicles (such as cars) and illegal 
contraband, would allow an unacceptable loophole in the government’s 
power to police society’s criminal element.155  Considering this societal 
goal to stop crime, the movement of a car containing contraband may be 
considered an emergency situation156 one which will result in harm if the 
criminal is released regardless of whether “articulable suspicion”157 that 
“[crime was] afoot” is feasible.158 
                                                 
148 See generally id. 
149 State’s Brief, supra note 78, at *4. 
150 Id. (citing to the A.C.L.U.’s Brief at 25–30). 
151 See generally Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
152 See generally Terry, 392 U.S. at 1. 
153 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (describing exigent circumstances as 
emergency conditions). 
154 See generally 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
155 Id. 
156 See generally Adams, 442 U.S. at 143 (considering an emergency situation to be one 
where a suspicious person possesses a firearm in public). 
157 Terry, 392 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
158 Id. at 30. 
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The hypothetical situation set forth earlier in this Article, although 
still disturbing, would seem drastically different from a detached 
observer’s point of view if the proposed “vehicular frisk” standard 
applied.  The earlier hypothetical set forth a scenario in which a police 
officer made a traffic stop based solely on the race of the people in the 
vehicle, and then, while writing a ticket, walked a drug-detection dog 
around the vehicle.  When the dog made an ambiguous noise after the 
dog sniff was completed and some time passed, the officer forced the 
people out of the car and thoroughly searched it.  Finding nothing, he 
sent the scared and harassed boys on their way.  Under the “vehicular 
frisk” standard, the officer could stop the vehicle and question the driver 
but then would have to allow him to leave unless the officer chose to 
engage in an extreme violation of the law. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, limiting the Fourth Amendment acceptability of an 
interrogatory dog-sniff through the implementation of a “vehicular 
frisk” standard, specifically when an officer merely has an articulable 
suspicion that crime is afoot, could reduce the fear of citizen abuse, 
improve society’s impression of police officers, and still allow police 
officers the discretion needed to locate illegal contraband. 
In Davis v. United States,159 the Supreme Court responded to 
warnings regarding its holding not requiring police officers to ask 
clarifying questions upon an ambiguous request for counsel by 
explaining, “[w]e recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the right to 
counsel might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, 
intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will 
not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to 
have a lawyer present.”160  This loathsome statement reveals that the 
Supreme Court, in 1994, had knowledge that a certain segment of society 
would suffer abuse due to a decision that could have been resolved with 
the simple implementation of some further prophylactic requirement.  In 
particular, although he had an overall positive outlook of police officers, 
Justice White expressed concern about facilitating police officer abuse of 
underprivileged members of society.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
White stated as follows: 
[M]ost police officers will decline the Court's invitation 
and will continue to do their jobs as best they can in 
                                                 
159 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
160 Id. at 460. 
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accord with the Fourth Amendment.  But the very 
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to answer the justified 
fear that governmental agents cannot be left totally to 
their own devices, and the Bill of Rights is enforceable in 
the courts because human experience teaches that not all 
such officials will otherwise adhere to the stated 
precepts.  Some policemen simply do act in bad faith, 
even if for understandable ends, and some deterrent is 
needed.  In the rush to limit the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule somewhere, anywhere, the Court 
ignores precedent, logic, and common sense to exclude 
the rule’s operation from situations in which, 
paradoxically, it is justified and needed.161 
Unfortunately for socioeconomically disadvantaged and minority 
citizens, the Supreme Court has again made a decision which will lead to 
episodes of police abuse, despite the Court’s opportunity to adopt an 
alternate reasoning and decide otherwise.  Hopefully the Court will 
reconsider its past holdings and apply the proposed “vehicular frisk” 
standard to situations similar to the one posed in Caballes. 
                                                 
161 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 169 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). 
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